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In recent years, the phrase “both sides” has become a social media meme, parodizing the journalistic 
trope of prioritizing neutrality at all costs. Here’s one egregious example, in a tweet directing to an 
article on “civility” the New York Times remarked, “Mr. Trump rails against illegal immigrants as 
‘murders and thieves’ who want to ‘infest the country.’ Some of his opponents respond with rage.” The 
implication is that there’s a balance between overtly racist speech and angry responses to that speech. 
Or, there’s an epistemological or moral requirement that any partisan utterance be framed as a part of a 
two-party debate. In the same vein, Trump himself, in the wake of a violent confrontation between 
racist white nationalists and protesters in Charlottesville, Virginia, remarked that there are good people 
“on both sides” of that issue. Perhaps the apotheosis of “both sides” might be the Texas high school 
teacher who asked students to list the positives and negatives of American chattel slavery, in order to 
give a “balanced view.” Parody aside, in one sense, to allude to the good ideas of both sides or the 
failings of both sides is a kind of rhetorical ploy to suggest fair-mindedness. In another sense, the very 
idea of “both sides” reflects a deeper tendency to view disagreements dichotomously; it presupposes an 
account of the options—one side, or the other.   
 To a casual student of argumentation, however, the invocation of “both sides” seems like a 
virtuous one. After all, awareness of differing or opposed opinions is one hallmark of a person who is 
authentically critically engaged on an issue—one who knows both the norm of balance and the actually 
balancing things. Beyond that, we’re often urged to wait to hear both sides of the story and to walk in 
someone else’s shoes. We’re on our guard against journalism that is one sided and for people who are 
biased. We’re praised for being even-handed or balanced in adjudicating facts. We might call this the 
norm of balance. The norm of balance is a meta-norm; it has to do with regulating our attitudes toward 
the existence of multiple arguments, rather than our attitudes within arguments, such that we apply 
critical norms in a balanced, judicious, or fair way. 
 While there is clearly a virtue to be found in balance, some scholars have recently alleged that 
there is corresponding vice of balance, a fallacy of middle ground as it were. No one, however, has 
given a robust account of either the fallaciousness or the variations of the fallacy. This is what I intend 
to do in this paper. 
